Nuclear proliferation in South Asia: Pakistan's policy and option by Khanna, D.D.
ACDIS KHA 1 
1986 
OCCPAP 
ACDIS Library
NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION IN SOUTH ASIA PAKISTAN'S POLICY AND
OPTION
D D KHANNA
UNIVERSITY OF ALLAHABAD 
MAY 1986
Draft prepared for the workshop organised by the University of Illinois 
at Urbana - Champaign under their programme in Arms Control and 
disarmament and National Security
Introduction
The development of nuclear technology in South Asia, especially in 
relation to Pakistan and India have attracted world wide concern and the 
interest of the Super Powers, and of China and the Arab world In recent 
years several studies have apprehended that South and West Asian regions 
are the most likely areas for a future nuclear conflic t 1 In both Pakistan 
and India a serious debate is on over the nuclear weapon option and unless 
public opinion asserts in favor of non-proliferation of the nuclear weapon 
programme, neither Pakistan nor India is likely to declare its nuclear weapon 
option
While this debate generates active interest, the governments of Pakistan 
and India consistantly stated that they are committed to the peaceful use 
of nuclear energy^ express apprehension and suspicion of each other, and 
make identical statements about the nuclear weapon development programme 
While the Indian Prime Minister, Mr Rajiv Gandhi declared in the Parliament 
that India did not want to make nuclear weapons although Pakistan had 
not abondoned its nuclear weapon programme, President Zia-ul-Haq of
Pakistan fe lt concerned about India having "already acquired the nuclear
2
weapons capability" The Pakistan Foreign Minister categorically stated
in the U N General Assembly that Pakistan is and shall be committed
to not developing nuclear weapons and to not allowing their deployment
on its soil Identical observation is also reported to have been made by
the Pakistan Foreign Secretary to his counterpart in India that Pakistan
had neither the resources nor the capability of producing the nuclear bomb
3
and that its programme was for peaceful purposes
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Responsible officia ls and influential political parties in both the
countries have however, made statements contrary to the offic ia l stand
and have favoured the desirability and stated the capability of developing
the nuclear weapon programme In India, the Congress (I) Parliamentary
Party Secretary has asserted that the Indian Government should go in for
4
the nuclear bomb and also prepare the masses to face the on-slought
The new Indian Chief of Army Staff stated that if the adversary used
nuclear weapon against India "our armed forces w ill not be made to fight
5
in a disadvantages position" In Pakistan also the ruling Muslim League 
and the Right Wing Jamat-lslami have repeatedly stressed the need to 
develop nuclear weapon capability Dr A Q Khan, the brain behind the 
Pakistan Uranium enrichment plant, made a pointed reference of Pakistan's 
capability of making a bomb He fe lt that Pakistan has le ft India far 
behind in enrichment technology and now the making of the bomb is only 
a political decision and we will never disappoint the nation 7
Pakistan's Case
From its inception Pakistan envinced a strong psychological impulse 
to seek an identity outside that of India, from which it  was carved out 
The Pakistani elite fe lt an urge to demonstrate that their smaller muslim 
nation was qualitatively equal or superior to India in many respects Initially
Q
this was sought to be achieved by establishing strong ties with the U S 
As early as 1949 an U S assessment also indicated that Pakistan, Afghanistan 
and the Karachi-Lahore areas are vital for the US to meet her basic
o
strategic objective in the region This sim ilarity of national interest 
between Pakistan and the United States continues and has provided Pakistan
-3-
the desired security with the result that Pakistan could modernize her armed
forces without any significant strain on her economy In early 1960s the
Pakistan thought it  was in her national interest to develop close relations
with China, and she successfully helped the U S A  to restablish friendly
understanding with the one time hostile China The Sino-lndian conflict
of 1962 and firs t Chinese nuclear explosion in 1964 generated a strong
desire in India to achieve nuclear weapon capability The late Indian Prime
Minister Shastri announced in the Parliament "I cannot say that the present
policy - nuclear programme for energy alone - is deep rooted, that it  cannot
be set aside and that it would not be changed" 10 It is during this period
that, in Pakistan also, Mr Z A  Bhutto talked about the need to have a
nuclear bomb and wrote about the desirability of obtaining it before the
crisis began 11 In 1972 when Bhutto came to power he thought that fate
12had placed him in a position "when Pakistan was going to have a bomb"
Bhutto gave birth to the theory of Islamic bomb This theory, even if it
may never materialize, serves Pakistan's national interest in many ways
likely leadership of the muslim world, undercutting Indian influence in the
Middle East, greater economic and m ilitary support from the Arabs, gains
from the anti-ziomst fronts, and stronger bargaining power with the U S 
13and the West Since then Pakistan has never looked back on her keen 
desire to produce a nuclear weapon
The dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971 and the Indian nuclear explo­
sion in 1974 symbolized the emergence of India as a dominant force in 
South Asia capable of dealing with any situation on her own India's status 
could no longer be ignored Pakistan strongly fe lt that it  was imperative
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for her to further strengthen her security and speedily develop nuclear 
technology to match that of India so that she had not to compromise on 
her national interest 14 Pakistan's apprehensions of India's nuclear technolo­
gical advancement made her feel that she would have to live under the
shadow of a hostile and powerful nuclear neighbour unless she possessed 
a nuclear deterrent 15 However, Pakistan realises the grave consequences 
of a nuclear arms race, and in the last few years has initiated proposals
to seek cooperation from India towards nuclear non-proliferation in South 
Asia The proposals include the establishment of a nuclear weapon free 
zone (NWFZ), mutual inspection, safeguards of nuclear installations, and 
a no-war pact Most of these have not received a positive response as 
India feels that Pakistan's current enrichment programme has no conceivable 
peaceful use, that the South Asian NWFZ would be a legal myth, and that
mutual inspection and verification between India and Pakistan would create
16additional irritations without solving any problem
India has suggested an alternative to the Pakistani proposal of a no
war pact A powerful pro-bomb lobby in India feels that "Pakistan is a 
collaborationist state of the nuclear imperialists" and proposals for the 
signing of a NPT/NWFZ, treaty with mutual inspection, or for jointly giving 
up the nuclear option have been made with an objective to disarm the 
subcontinent and render it  vulnerable vis-a-vis the nuclear powers surround­
ing it  17 This group is also convinced that if India has to make serious
efforts towards nuclear disarmament she must acquire nuclear weapon 
capability Otherwise she will have to live permanently and helplessly 
with the nuclear weapons of "industrialised nations, their chosen client 
states, and China", with all the risk of the "coersive use of nuclear diplo-
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18macy inherent in the situation" In spite of these constraints India and
Pakistan have agreed not to attack each others nuclear installations Both
19India and Pakistan feel that it is a great step forward India feels that
an agreement on an Indian offer of a treaty of friendship and co-operation
with Pakistan and the latters offer of a no war pact with India could also
?0be evolved in the near future 
Interest of Superpowers
The apprehensions that India and Pakistan are pursuing a nuclear
weapon programme has its own global implications The Soviet Union has
repeatedly voiced her deep concern over Pakistan's clandestine efforts to
achieve nuclear weapon capability and has accused both, the Imperial
Powers and China, in conniving at Pakistan, trying to achieve nuclear status
The Soviets also feel that the likely nuclear weapon capability of Pakistan,
now a frontline state vis-a-vis the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, is a couse
of great concern to their interest Pakistan on the other hand thinks,
if they could tolerate the Pokhran explosion as peaceful why should they
not treat Pakistan on the same ground However, the Soviet Union is likely
to cooperate on nonproliferation, but if Pakistan should choose to go nuclear
there may be some "selective weakening of Soviet restraint vis-a-vis the
21Indian nuclear programme But, the Soviets are very apprehensive about 
a jo int US - Pakistan - China approach against Soviet interests in the 
region and w ill therefore oppose any nuclear weapon development programme 
on Pakistani soil
The U S also is strongly opposed to any nuclear weapon proliferation 
programme in South Asia and has repeatedly expressed her concern over
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Pakistan's efforts to acquire nuclear weapon technology However, the 
presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan has changed the U S security 
perspective in South Asia To meet this development it  appears that the 
U S needs Pakistan more than Pakistan needs the U S The Reagan adminis­
tration has realised that somehow, the U S foreign policy w ill have to
22find a way of rewarding friends and penalising opponents Although
Pakistan's engagement in nuclear activities are "found troubling to US
23but it  takes its peaceful intent seriously" The U S has suggested to
Pakistan that it  should not link the signing of the NPT with India, and
Pakistan should pursue its nuclear programme for peaceful purposes alone
24to get more and more U S aid and cooperation Among domestic political
factors, the powerful Jewish lobby in the United States has always opposed
Pakistan's nuclear programme as it  is apprehensive of Pakistan's considerable
25dependence on the Arab world and their interest in nuclear technology 
India, however feels that the present regime in Pakistan is confident that 
it  can go on expanding the frontiers of its nuclear weapon programme 
without putting at risk the U S m ilitary assistance and political support 
as long as if refrains from actually detonating a nuclear device
China's position in the Pakistan's nuclear programme has been vailed 
in secrecy and uncertainty China is against the superpower monopoly 
of nuclear weapon technology The Chinese interest in a Pakistani bomb 
is very natural to keep balance in South Asia vis-a-vis India Reports circula­
ted both in the U S and the USSR indicate that China has been providing
26nuclear cooperation to Pakistan to embarass the USSR and India India
27also feels convinced of such a co-operation , but this has been denied
28by China as 'absurd' and 'to ta lly  groundless'
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It can now be argued that security in South Asia is not likely to
be a regional problem and threat to this region can also emanate from
non-regional powers The U S and the Soviets have always tried to acquire
m ilitary facilities in the Indian Ocean region and w ill continue to do so
The U S has recently acquired communication facilities in Trmcomalee,
the finest natural harbour of the Indian Ocean, in Sri Lanka and there
are waves of speculation that the U S may also like to have facilities
99
on the coast of Makran, in Pakistan The presence of the Soviet Union
in Afghanistan, their interest in the Indian Ocean region, and the Indo-Soviet
Friendship Treaty of 1971 create a compulsion for the U S to help Pakistan
and to continue their involvement in the region In this context the Super
Powers are not likely to withdraw from the region but w ill certainly come
closer to one or the other likely nuclear regional power to maintain a
balance Pakistan feels that the Indo-Soviet 1971 treaty has made India
30a pillar of the Soviet Unions Asian collective security system 
Neighbouring Countries
The alleged efforts of India and Pakistan to achieve nuclear weapon 
capability have caused anxiety and concern to the smaller neighbouring 
states and if one could apply the domino-theory to the region it could 
be presumed that each time a country goes nuclear it  increases the pressure 
on sim ilarly situated neighbouring countries to do the same Some of these 
smaller countries may not like nuclear asymmetry to reach beyond a point 
and may feel compelled to develop a nuclear status for themselves by any 
method, preferably through the nuclear umbrella of super powers In such 
a case the South Asian region w ill become a hot bed of nuclear rivalry
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However, a strong lobby both in India and Pakistan feels that horizontal
31nuclear proliferation is not necessarily dangerous or destablismg 
Pakistan's Interest
It is agreed by policy makers both in India and Pakistan that nuclear
co-operation between the two countries would not only be in their own
32interest but also in the interest of the region and of the whole world 
However, the element of suspicion and apprehensions between the two coun­
tries has activiated debate in favour of a nuclear weapon option In spite 
of this the policy makers in Pakistan must accept that "even a declared
peaceful nuclear explosion is most likely to lead to an all out Indian nuclear 
33e ffo rt" and in such a nuclear arms race Pakistan would find itself at
a distinct disadvantage (because Pakistan presently lacks the technical base
needed for a quick build-up of survivable launch and delivery system)^,
while India is likely to successfully develop IRBM capability by the end
of this decade and its satellite will develop its command and control 
35capability It is also estimated that during the same given period India
q e
can build nearly three times more warheads than Pakistan The theory 
of deterrence in such a situation can not be applicable to a country which 
has no capability to deter the firs t strike and to develop her strike capabi­
lity  beyond a certain range which w ill make the firs t strike less effective 
The physical closeness of India and Pakistan and the presence of densely 
populated cities on both sides of the border may bring catastrophy if a 
nuclear war by accident or a nuclear strike in sheer desperation takes place 
Pakistan being a small country with no depth is likely to suffer unimaginable 
damage in all respects There is every reason to believe that in such a
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situation the entire logistical machinery of the fighting troops with conven­
tional weaponry will also collapse Further, Pakistan's emperiment with 
nuclear explosion even for peaceful purposes will certainly change the 
present U S -Pakistan relations and may have serious implications for 
Pakistan's security It will therefore be in the interest of Pakistan to 
proceed with a conviction that India may not escalate its nuclear weapon 
programme as it has given no such indications since its last nuclear explosion 
in 1974
Pakistan can not ignore that India is a very active member of the 
non-aligned movement and is committed to universal disarmament It will 
certainly not be in her interest to go all out for nuclear weapon develop­
ment programme, vhich will give her more insecurity and will adversely 
affect her global ambitions
It w ill be in the interest of Pakistan to concentrate on her peaceful
nuclear development programme and not to compete with the Indian nuclear
37programme as her economy is largely dependent on foreign sources
Pakistan hopelessly lacks conventional sources of energy and her atomic
by'December 1985
generation efforts have given her/on ly  125 Mw as compared to India's 
1240 Mw It is therefore essential for Pakistan to concentrate on the 
development of her economy with all speed as an economically viable 
Pakistan is a much more dependable alternative for her stability and 
security
It w ill be against Pakistan's interest to accelerate the pace of a 
nuclear explosion even for peaceful purposes as it  w ill be taken as a decla­
ration of nuclear option It w ill not be in the interest of Pakistan to
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dec I are her nuclear weapon option until India does the same or takes 
recourse to further explosion Several countries in the world, and especially 
India, believe that Pakistan has developed a nuclear device, and if Pakistan 
by any chance decides in favour of the explosion, it  is likely to get so 
much punishment that it will have no oolitical stamina le ft to stand In 
the absence of any explosion by Pakistan, India cannot prove that Pakistan 
has gone nuclear It should be remembered that whether Pakistan decides
In favour of an explosion or not India is already ten years ahead and any 
competition to achieve symmetry with India w ill have serious economic 
and political consequences Both international and national interest there­
fore demand that Pakistan should not choose the path of nuclear weapon 
programme which w ill ultimately encourage nuclear proliferation in the 
South Asian Region and also involve super and major powers more deeply 
in this region The dangers of nuclear proliferation in South Asia can also 
be minimized considerably with the help of institutions like SARC and NAVI, 
where a large group of countries can put their weight together against
nuclear weapon proliferation in the South Asian region
Against this background one could quote an observation of Sri P N 
Haksar at a Seminar held in India on the "Role of Nuclear Weapon in Inter­
national Relations vis-a-vis the Developing World" He observed "the 
compulsion of real politik and the conflicting interest of the major nations 
had resulted in the evolution of frightening doctrines such as that of
deterrence escalating into mutually assured destruction This means that
the present nuclear regime had a vested interest, economic, political and 
technological in building up nuclear arsenals and in non-proliferation, nuclear
powers have been placed m a dilemma in which mspite of a leverage that 
nuclear weapons give them, they cannot in practice use them'* "Nuclear
weapons today, thus, serve to articulate, v iv ify and formulate explicitly
38the perplexity of our time"
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